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Abstract 
While women in Europe who wear the Islamic headscarf are generally seen as outsiders who do not belong to the na-
tion, some countries are more tolerant towards the wearing of headscarves than others. France, Germany and the 
Netherlands have developed different policies regarding veiling. In this paper we describe how headscarves became 
regulated in each of these countries and discuss the ways in which French, Dutch and German politicians have deliber-
ated the issue. The paper is based on a content analysis of parliamentary debates on veiling in France (1989–2007), 
Germany (1997–2007) and the Netherlands (1985–2007). Our aim is to discuss what these national political debates re-
veal about the way in which the social inclusion of Islamic women in (or rather exclusion from) the nation is perceived 
in these three countries. Our claim is that veiling arouses opposition because it challenges national self-understandings. 
Yet, because nations have different histories of nation building, these self-understandings are challenged in various 
ways and hence, governments have responded to headscarves with diverse regulation. While we did find national dif-
ferences, we also discovered that the political debates in the three countries are converging over time. The trend is to-
wards increasingly gendered debates and more restrictive headscarf policies. This, we hypothesize, is explained by in-
ternational polarization around Islam and the strength of the populist anti-immigrant parties across Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
The Islamic headscarf has become a contested issue in 
Europe.1 Yet while some countries have issued bans, 
others explicitly grant women the right to wear a head-
                                                          
1 There exist many forms of Muslim women’s covering. The 
main distinctions are between the headscarf and the burqa 
and niqab. The burqa covers the face including the eyes, while 
the niqab leaves free the eyes. In the time-period we studied 
the debates focused mainly on the headscarf. 
scarf, and still others have no regulation at all. In this 
paper we discuss the framing and regulation of the 
headscarf in three countries: the Netherlands, Germa-
ny and France. These countries are believed to repre-
sent different citizenship and state-church models. We 
did find national differences in the framing and regula-
tion of the headscarf and wanted to discover whether 
these can be attributed to these models. Yet across 
countries, headscarves increasingly became framed as 
contravening dominant gender notions. Therefore we 
considered also the role of the (institutionalized) wom-
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en’s movement in the national debates. We found in all 
three countries that occasionally there were actors 
who contested the dominant framing and who pro-
posed a more inclusive idea of national identity.  
We followed an inductive approach: as laws are 
made in parliament we made a content analysis of par-
liamentary debates on the headscarf in France (1989–
2007), Germany (1997–2007) and the Netherlands 
(1985–2007). In 1985 the issue of the headscarf ap-
peared for the first time on the political agenda in the 
Netherlands. We extended the period to 2007 to be 
able to trace possible effects of watershed political 
events like 9/11. The debates after 2007 were analyzed 
less systematically.2 We looked at the arguments that 
were given by actors in Parliament for the regulation or 
non-regulation of the headscarf, and what these argu-
ments tell us about the way that the social inclusion of 
Islamic women in (or rather exclusion from) the nation 
was conceived. We also traced the influence of im-
portant legal court rulings or legal advice on the fram-
ing and regulating of the headscarf.  
We will first explain the notion of national citizenship 
and state-church models. Then we explain our method-
ology and present per country the way the headscarf is 
regulated and how this was argued in Parliament. In the 
conclusion we come back to the question of whether or 
not national models of citizenship and state-church rela-
tions explain the regulation of the headscarf in each of 
the three countries, and what this framing tells us about 
the social inclusion of Islamic women. 
2. National Models of Citizenship and State-Church 
Relations 
The idea of national citizenship models impacting the 
social inclusion of immigrants can be traced back to 
Rogers Brubaker’s study on citizenship and nationhood 
in France and Germany (Brubaker, 1992). The thrust of 
his argument is that when in the 19th century the French 
and German state was formed, there evolved in both 
countries a nation-specific understanding of nationhood. 
Once established, these understandings proved to have 
path-dependent effects on these countries’ present-
day immigration and citizenship policies. Several au-
thors (e.g. Castles, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005) fol-
lowed up this idea and suggested that it is these very 
traditions of citizenship that explain why countries dif-
fer in the extent to which they are open to accommo-
date cultural difference. France, Germany and the 
Netherlands would represent respectively a republican, 
an ethno-cultural and multicultural model. 
In order to explain country responses to the inte-
gration of Muslim immigrants in particular, several 
theorists have also included state-church relations as 
                                                          
2 A major change is that after 2007 the emphasis shifted to 
face-veiling. See Ferrari and Pastorelli (2013). 
an explanatory variable (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Foblets & 
Alidadi, 2013; Koenig, 2007; Modood & Kastoryano, 
2006). In this literature, France is seen as a prototypical 
example of a strict church-state separation model. State 
neutrality is assumed to be best achieved through a 
hands-off approach to religion: the state should not 
identify with any religion nor prioritize any religious 
group over another, and abstain from recognizing and 
funding religious groups. The Netherlands figures as an 
ideal-typical example of a pluralist model. Here state 
neutrality is achieved not by banning religion from public 
life, but by treating all religious and secular worldviews 
in an evenhanded way. Germany is typically character-
ized as a pluralistic corporatist model. Based on agree-
ments (concordats) between the state and the church 
the two officially cooperate. In this paper, we under-
stand state-church relations to serve as key parts of 
countries’ conceptions of nationhood, because the legal 
and political status of religion is inherently intertwined 
with a nation’s social organization and construction 
(Asad, 2006; Koenig, 2007). 
In the republican-secularist model the nation is 
conceived of as an undivided community of citizens 
that share common political principles. The state is a 
strong, centralized body that stands above its citizens. 
In order to secure common citizenship, citizens are 
asked to abstract from their particularistic identities 
and exist in the public sphere as citizens only. Anyone 
who is willing to subscribe to the nation’s principles 
can in theory become a citizen. This model is therefore 
open to accept immigrants as citizens, but they are ex-
pected to assimilate in one uniform nation and to avoid 
pubic expressions of their personal religious affilia-
tions. And indeed in France immigrants have easy ac-
cess to citizenship, yet assimilation to ‘French’ univer-
sal values like equality and liberty is required. While 
the state takes a hands-off approach to religious doc-
trine, it simultaneously officially recognizes Islam as 
'cultes' (organised religions, not communities) similar 
to Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist religions. Since 2002 
it has recognised the French Muslim Council (‘Conseil 
Français du Culte Musulman’, CFCM) as an official in-
terlocutor comparable to the Catholic, Jewish and 
Protestant religious councils (Laborde, 2008). 
An ethno-cultural corporatist model conceives of 
the nation as a culturally homogeneous community. 
The nation is considered as the political extension of an 
already existing ethnic community based on a common 
history, culture and language. Because of its cultural 
monism, it has difficulty both in accepting cultural al-
iens as citizens and in allowing for any other than the 
dominant majority’s culture in public life. Indeed Ger-
many long excluded non-ethnically German migrants 
from citizenship and did not grant them cultural rights. 
Germany’s church-state relations still institutionally fa-
vour historically dominant Christian churches with 
whom the state cooperates in sectors such as educa-
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tion, health and social welfare. Only the three main his-
torical religious communities (Catholic, Evangelical and 
Jewish) are granted legal status as public corporations, 
which yields them specific privileges. Länder Govern-
ments have thus far refused to grant Islam the status of 
an officially recognised religion and public body.  
Lastly, in a multicultural pluralist model, the nation 
is united by a thin core of common values, which goes 
together with the co-existence of groups that have 
their distinctive group identities. A multicultural model 
is open to accept immigrants as citizens and is open to 
cultural diversity. The Netherlands used to combine 
easy access to citizenship with a policy of integration 
based on the preservation of cultural group identities, 
and its state-church model ensures equal treatment of 
all religious groups, including Muslim groups, and equal 
access to the public sphere. Unlike France, the state 
does not attempt to secularise the public sphere; un-
like Germany, it does not grant any public status to and 
cuts all financial ties with organised religions.  
From these models one would expect France and 
Germany, yet for different reasons, to be less open to 
cultural and religious manifestations of migrants and to 
restrict the wearing of the headscarf, and the Nether-
lands to have accommodative regulation. Although 
German state-church relations offer favourable oppor-
tunities for the public expression of religion, the lack of 
public status of Islam in Germany makes us expect that 
Muslim communities benefit less from these opportu-
nities than in the Netherlands.  
However, the idea of national citizenship models 
explaining modes of integration has become contest-
ed.3 European policies on immigrant integration appear 
according to Christian Joppke (2007) to converge. 
Comparing civic integration tests in five countries, in-
cluding our three countries, Ines Michalowski (2011) 
and Saskia Bonjour (2010) find national differences 
that do not correspond with the national citizenship 
models. Noticing a widespread backlash against multi-
culturalism, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller doubt 
whether the multicultural model still exists in Europe 
(Castles & Miller, 2011). In sum, critics maintain that 
citizenship models are too deterministic and too static, 
as they cannot explain changes over time within a 
country or convergences between countries. Are na-
tional models indeed passé? After explaining our 
methodology, we turn to the regulation of the head-
scarf and the debates that accompanied the introduc-
tion of the rules.  
3. Methodology 
The main documents that were studied for this article 
consist of all parliamentary debates about headscarves 
in Germany, France and the Netherland, from the mo-
                                                          
3 See for an early critique Silverman (1992). 
ment the first public controversy arose (that was in the 
Netherlands in 1985) until 2007. All documents were 
found in the parliamentary databases of each country 
by means of keywords such as ‘foulard’, ‘hidjeb’, ‘voile 
islamique’, ‘hoofddoek’, ‘Kopftuch’, ‘Schleier’.4 As Ger-
many has a federal system and the issue was hardly 
discussed at the federal level (the ‘Bundesrat’), we 
turned to the regional level. As it was not possible to 
study the debates in all sixteen states, documents were 
retrieved from the parliamentary databases of four 
federal states: Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Schleswig-
Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate. In total 192 law 
proposals, motions, parliamentary discussion, ques-
tions and policy documents were found, which were 
completed by other policy documents such as research 
reports of (extra) parliamentary committees, as well as 
a study of important court verdicts and decisions of 
(quasi) judicial bodies on individual headscarf conflicts.  
We used frame-analysis to analyze the documents, 
which builds upon the social constructionist tradition in 
the social sciences that assumes that people construct 
realities by the way they think and talk about phenom-
ena (Schön & Rein, 1995; Verloo, 2005). Frames are 
thus symbolic-interpretive constructs used to make 
sense of a multifaceted issue such as the headscarf 
conflict, which at the same time shape reality by in-
scribing meaning to it. In order to identify the frames, 
we employed an analytical framework that exists of 
sensitizing questions focused on four elements (Verloo, 
2005): voice (who speaks), diagnosis (what is seen as a 
problem), prognosis (what is seen as the solution) and 
a call for action (who is called upon to act upon the 
problem). All documents were coded according to 
these four elements of the matrix. Based on a compari-
son of these matrixes, three major frame-categories 
were found that were further divided in sub-frames: 
frames that addressed headscarves in relation to state-
church relations, frames that discuss headscarves in re-
lation to social cohesion and/or public order and 
frames that discuss headscarves in relation to gender 
(see Lettinga 2011 for more on the methodology used). 
                                                          
4 The Dutch databases were: www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl 
and www.parlando.sdu.nl. For France we visited: www.assem 
blee-nationale.fr (from 1993). Documents from before 1993 
were collected manually in the archives of the Parliament in 
Paris. Documents from the French Senate were retrieved from 
www.senat.fr. For Germany we visited www.dip.bundestag.de. 
The federal states have their own online databases; documents 
that were not online we collected from the archives. An ex-
planatory note on the references: TK 59 = Tweede Kamer 
(Dutch Second Chamber), Parliamentary Report nr. 59. JO 
15577 = Journal Officiel de la Republique Française, Parliamen-
tary Report nr. 15577. BW 13/62 = digital archive of the Par-
liament of Baden Württemberg, Parliamentary Report nr. 
13/62. RP = Rhineland Palatinate. B = Berlin. All documents are 
followed by the date and when necessary the page number. 
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4. France: Framing and Regulation of the Headscarf 
As widely reported elsewhere (Bowen, 2007; Rochefort, 
2002; Scott, 2007) the debate in France started in 1989 
when three schoolgirls in the city of Creil were not al-
lowed to wear a headscarf at school. The school princi-
pal argued that the headscarf could yield pressure on 
others to cover against their will. After seeking advice of 
the State Council (Conseil d’Etat), the highest adminis-
trative court of France, the Socialist Minister of Educa-
tion, Lionel Jospin, ruled that students wearing signs of 
religious affiliation in public schools was not necessarily 
in conflict with public neutrality (laïcité), as long as they 
did not disturb the educational order in schools or seek 
to proselytize their religion.5 Three weeks later, the So-
cialist government issued a Directive to schools encour-
aging them to take a case-by-case approach in assessing 
whether the religious manifestation in question was ex-
pressed within the confines of this neutrality, and to dis-
cuss the issue before expelling pupils.6  
Not all parties felt comfortable with the Minister’s 
decision. Among them was the Rassemblement pour la 
République (RPR), which framed the headscarf as an act 
of provocation of the French Republican pact, signifying 
a segregation from the rest of society (a ‘repli communi-
taire’) and a politicized symbol of religious fundamental-
ism (‘intégrisme’) challenging the secular and democratic 
state.7 From the onset of the debate, both the Left and 
the Right agreed that the headscarf conflicted with prin-
ciples of gender equality. Both viewed the Republican 
school as a motor for girls’ emancipation by providing 
them with the tools to break with their patriarchal 
community and to integrate into ‘French’ society. As 
RPR-member Michèle Barzach argued: ‘The integration 
of the Muslim population passes through its women, 
and the integration of women passes through schools’.8 
Yet, while the RPR concluded that headscarves should 
therefore be banned from public schools, prominent 
members of the Socialist party argued that a ban was 
counterproductive. Prime-minister Michel Rocard (PS) 
explained: ‘The aim of our public and laic school is to 
welcome, to persuade, to integrate, that means, to real-
ize the goals of education in another way than through a 
politics of a priori exclusion’.9 Therefore a ban on head-
scarves was unwarranted. 
After the turn of the century the Socialist party (PS) 
changed its position. Instead of the gradual assimilation 
they had expected, headscarf conflicts kept emerging in 
public schools throughout the 1990s. In 2003, some PS 
members submitted a proposal to ban all religious, polit-
ical and philosophic symbols from school, framing the 
                                                          
5 JO 346 893, 27 November 1989. 
6 JO 15577, 15 November 1989. 
7 JO 4756-4757, 8 November 1989. 
8 JO 4756-4757, 8 November 1989. 
9 JO 4751-4752, 8 November 1989. 
headscarf as a ‘contestation of French values and cul-
ture’, and ‘a rejection, often imposed on young girls, of 
the Republican and laic model of integration’.10 Also the 
Right submitted (again) several proposals to ban reli-
gious dress in public schools. In July 2003, President 
Jacques Chirac installed the Commission of Reflection on 
the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the Republic’ 
(‘Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe 
de laïcité dans la République’) to study the status of sec-
ularism in present-day France. This commission, known 
as the Commission Stasi, concluded that a ban was 
needed (Stasi, 2003). On 10 February 2004, a large ma-
jority in parliament voted in favour of a government law-
proposal for a ban on ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols in 
the public school. On 15 March 2004, the French gov-
ernment passed the law that came into effect the sub-
sequent school year. The Ministry of Educations sent a 
Directive to all public schools that explained that head-
scarves, kippahs and large Christian crosses are consid-
ered as conspicuous signs of religious affiliation, and are 
prohibited.  
This change went together with a change in diagno-
sis. Before, girls who wore a headscarf were seen as 
girls who needed to be emancipated; now attention 
focused on girls who did not wear the headscarf and 
who needed to be protected against their communi-
ties. The actions of the new feminist movement, Nei-
ther Whores nor Submissives (‘Ni Putes Ni Soumises’, 
NPNS), may have contributed to this change in framing. 
The chair of NPNS, Fadela Amara, who later became a 
Socialist Junior Minister, spoke out in favor of legisla-
tion banning headscarves in schools. Together with 
other prominent Republican feminists, among others 
Elisabeth Badinter, Anne Zelensky (the chair of the 
League of Women’s Rights, LDF) and former Minister of 
Emancipation Yvette Roudy, NPNS signed a petition in 
Elle magazine in 2003 to encourage French President 
Jacques Chirac to impose a ban. Amara was also invited 
by the Stasi commission to testify, and the commission 
literally copied in its report her testimony that many 
young girls were called ‘whores’ if they did not cover 
(Stasi, 2003, p. 46). The commission concluded that a 
‘great silent majority’ of young girls of immigrant origin 
needed protection against Islamist groups forcing them 
to cover (Stasi, 2003, p. 58). The struggle for gender 
equality subsequently became a struggle for national 
values, as is illustrated by the speech of President Chi-
rac, who stated that ‘our struggle for Republican values 
must go hand in hand with a struggle for women’s 
rights and their equality to men. This struggle will de-
termine the France of tomorrow. The degree of civiliza-
tion of a society is measured (…) by the status of wom-
en in that society’ (Chirac, 2003).  
The lack of headscarf-wearing girls’ own voices in 
French public and policy debates triggered the mobili-
                                                          
10 JO law proposal 2096, 2003. 
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sation of new feminist coalitions seeking to break the 
hegemonic frame that headscarf-wearing girls were 
oppressed, for example Feminists For Equality (‘Collec-
tif des Féministes pour l’Egalité’, CFE) that published a 
book in 2008 named ‘Veiled girls speak’ (Chouder, 
Latreche, & Tévanian, 2008). Others were the Parisian 
group, Neither Pimps nor Machos (‘Ni Proxos Ni Mach-
os, NPNM) that challenged the view that Muslim men 
were violent, and the ‘Movement of Indigenous of the 
Republic’ (‘Mouvement des Indigènes de la Re-
publique’, MIR) that argued that the 2003 law was a 
new form of post-colonialism, racism and sexism of a 
Republic which subjugated migrants to secondary sub-
jects (Bouteldja, 2007). Yet, not being invited to official 
policy consultations and unable to forge alliances ex-
cept for a few among the far left, they did not have the 
power to change the dominant discourse. 
The French debate on the headscarf did not carry 
over to other realms such as to the civil service or the 
judiciary. This is not indicative of a general tolerance of 
religious dress in other public domains. Rather, deputies 
never challenged the State Council’s opinion of May 3, 
2000, that civil servants, including school teachers and 
school inspectors, may not manifest their religious be-
liefs during work.11 Since 2009 the debate has shifted to 
the Islamic face veil, which was primarily framed as 
symbolising a radical Islamic practice that discriminated 
against women. On 22 June 2009 President Nicolas Sar-
kozy concurred with this view, arguing in a speech to the 
Senate and the Assembly at the Congress of Versailles: 
‘The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subser-
vience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the 
French republic’ (Sarkozy, 2009). One year later, in Sep-
tember 2010, the Parliament adopted a law that bans all 
kinds of face covers in public spaces, which took effect in 
April 2011.12 The face veil was seen as an attack on the 
French Republican social pact of living together and hu-
man dignity, including gender equality and liberty. The 
law was passed despite the advise of the State Council 
and a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that had 
both argued that there is no legal ground to oblige citi-
zens to always show their faces (Joppke, 2001). 
5. The Netherlands: Framing and Regulation  
of the Headscarf 
In the Netherlands a national controversy arose in 
1985 when a public school prohibited a pupil from 
wearing a headscarf. Members of Parliament chal-
                                                          
11 JO 217.017, 3 May 2000. 
12 Veiled women will be consulted by organisations with the 
aim to convince them to reconsider their choice within six 
months after their first arrest, and can be fined if they repeat-
edly ignore warnings of the police to unveil in public. People 
found guilty of forcing others to cover are penalised with fines 
up to €30.000 and a year in prison. 
lenged this decision, and the Christian Democratic Min-
ister of Education, Wim Deetman, announced that 
headscarves are allowed at public schools in the Neth-
erlands.13 More than a decade later, in 1998, the issue 
re-emerged on the political agenda, this time because 
a teacher trainee was prohibited from wearing a head-
scarf in a public primary school. Again, the government 
decided, thereby following the legal advice of the 
Committee of Equal Treatment,14 that a ban on reli-
gious dress for public school teachers constitutes a 
form of discrimination on grounds of religion. Later 
again, two MP’s of the Green Party brought up the is-
sue of a woman who was not allowed to wear her 
headscarf while working as the clerk of a court. The 
Green party disputed the idea that headscarves in 
court were at odds with public neutrality. The Dutch 
understanding of the separation between church and 
state was, according to the Greens, not ‘to exclude 
clergymen and religious traditions or signs from public 
life. (…) It means exactly the opposite: the state has no 
right to interfere with the religious beliefs of its sub-
jects’.15 The Liberal Minister of Justice Korthals disagreed 
that personnel in court could wear a headscarf and the 
court case eventually led to the policy report, Funda-
mental Rights in a Pluriform Society (‘Grondrechten in 
een pluriforme samenleving’).16 In this document the 
government recognized that a ban infringes upon the 
principle of individual choice, which the Dutch state 
holds in high esteem (and thus went a long way towards 
the position of the Greens): ‘The freedom of choice and 
right to self-determination that women in the Nether-
lands conquered holds equally for them (i.e. Muslim 
women). (...) A general ban on such cloths conflicts with 
this conquered freedom. (...) Also women with head-
scarves have the right to unlimited participation in Dutch 
society.’17 While the government confirmed the right of 
women to wear a headscarf, it made two exceptions. It 
did consider it legitimate to restrict this right for the po-
lice force and for the judiciary because these jobs re-
quire, according to the government, that all appearance 
of partiality is avoided.18 Again in 2008 when a new de-
bate about headscarves in the police force flared up, this 
policy was re-confirmed.19  
Hence, even in the Netherlands the wearing of the 
headscarf became bound to some restrictions. This co-
incided with the rise of the new populist party, List Pim 
Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF). The LPF became the 
second largest party in the elections of 2002 and had 
started a campaign against the ‘Islamization of Dutch 
                                                          
13 TK 700, 8 February 1985. 
14 Equal Treatment Committee Judgement 18 (1999). 
15 TK 59, 17 March 2004: 3887. 
16 TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004. 
17 TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004: 14-15. 
18 TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004. 
19 TK 29628, no. 109, 14 November 2008. 
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society’. The framing of Islam as a threat began reso-
nating particularly when the debate shifted to face co-
vers (burqas and niqabs). In a debate about terrorism 
in 2005, right-wing politician Geert Wilders introduced 
a motion to ban the burqa in public space.20 A majority 
in parliament adopted Wilders’ motion.2122 Face cover-
ing was framed mainly as a security and integration is-
sue. Liberal (VVD) MP Weekers argued, for instance: 
‘When people cover their face in public, whether this is 
with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously affects 
other people’s feelings of safety, and the care for a civil 
public order implies that we do not tolerate such face 
covers’.23 Parallel to this new emphasis on public order 
and security, gender equality became a more promi-
nent frame. Both conservative Liberal and populist 
right-wing deputies argued that ‘the burqa is a symbol 
of submission. This does not fit into our value-system’ 
(VVD).24 Left-wing parties and the Liberal Democrats 
(D’66) agreed that face covers are incompatible with an 
‘open and emancipated society’.25 Yet, instead of a ban 
they favoured to ‘emancipate the burqa away’.26 
The gendering of the debate was not a result of a 
greater involvement of the women’s movement in the 
policy debates. The platform for black, migrant and ref-
ugee women, Tiye International, as well as the Dutch 
Women’s Council (NVR) never addressed the issue of 
headscarves, which they generally perceive to be wom-
en’s own choice. Only Chief Editor Ciska Dresselhuys of 
the feminist monthly Opzij agitated against the head-
scarf as a sign of female oppression. Even feminist Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali who entered Parliament in 2003 and who was 
very critical about Islam, never politicised headscarves in 
Parliament. Dutch feminists never mobilised for restric-
tive legislation on the headscarf or the face-veil. Even 
though there was more discontent with the gendered 
nature of the face-veil within the Dutch women’s 
movement, feminists scholars in advisory committees 
and the Ministry argued that a full ban would possibly 
increase the isolation of women who wore a face-veil ra-
ther than contribute to their emancipation.27 
                                                          
20 TK 29754, no. 53, 13 October 2005. 
21 TK 36, 10 December 2005. 
22 TK 16, 24 October 2006. 
23 TK 15, 19 October 2006: 1073. 
24 TK 15, 19 October 2006: 1073. 
25 TK 31 700 VII, 25 December 2008. 
26 TK 16, 24 October 2006. 
27 See e.g. the advice of a committee that was installed by then 
Minister of Integration to study the feasibility and desirability 
of a ban on burqas (Vermeulen et al., 2006). The then State 
Secretary responsible for emancipation (and current Minister 
of Education) Jet Bussemaker (PvdA) answered in a reply to 
members of the PVV in 2008 that the burqini (a bathing suit 
that covers the legs, arms and hair of women) is not necessarily 
oppressive and can even enable women to partake in public 
life and gain independence. TK 1938, 11 April 2008. 
6. Germany: Framing and Regulation of the Headscarf 
The first parliamentary debates in Germany occurred in 
the southern federal state of Baden-Württemberg in 
1997, but only in 2003 the headscarf controversy be-
came a national affair when it spread to other federal 
states. The debate primarily focused on teachers’ rights to 
cover. In contrast to France and similar to the Nether-
lands, pupils’ headscarves have never been controversial.  
The case that triggered the first debate concerned 
Fereshta Ludin, a German teacher of Afghani origin. She 
had already worn a headscarf during her traineeship 
without any complaints from parents, but when she ap-
plied for a job as a teacher in 1998 in the city of Stuttgart, 
the Upper School Authority in Baden-Württemberg re-
fused to hire her because of her headscarf. The argu-
ment was that the headscarf was a sign of ‘cultural limi-
tation’ and that she therefore lacked the personal 
qualifications (‘Eignung’) for the status of a civil servant, 
who needs to respect state neutrality (Altinordu, 2004).  
The Minister of Education of Baden-Württemberg, 
Annette Schavan of the Christian Democrats (CDU), 
backed the decision of the Upper School Authority. As a 
teacher, Ludin was expected to distance herself from po-
litical ideologies that are in conflict with the state’s con-
stitutional values; Schavan did not consider the head-
scarf as a religious obligation.28 Ludin’s headscarf would 
also undermine the school’s mission to promote integra-
tion, as the headscarf ‘functioned as a sign of cultural 
and civilizational segregation and thus encourages disin-
tegration’.29 Most parties in the Land’s legislature, in-
cluding the oppositional Greens and Social Democrat 
party, supported the Minister’s decision.  
Five years later, on 24 September 2003, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled over Ludin’s case after a tardy 
legal battle through various lower courts and the Federal 
Administrative Court. The Federal Constitutional Court 
judged that a ban on teachers wearing the headscarf in 
school does not find enough legal ground in the standing 
law of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg. Allow-
ing teachers to wear headscarves did not contradict 
Germany’s tradition of neutrality, seen as ‘open and 
comprehensive neutrality’ (‘offene und übergreifende 
Neutralität). Therefore the law did not contain sufficient 
provisions to justify the restriction (Henkes & Kneip, 
2008, p. 13). The Court recognized however that given 
the religious diversity of present-day society, a teacher’s 
headscarf could yield conflicts and thus endanger educa-
tional peace. It ruled therefore that the growing religious 
diversity in society ‘can be a cause for the legislature to 
redefine the allowed range of religious relations in the 
school’ and to interpret the duty of public neutrality in a 
                                                          
28 Pressemitteilung no. 119/98 of Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Youth, 13 July 1998. 
29 BW 12/51, 15 July 1998: 3984. 
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‘stricter and more distanced way’.30 
Since then eight of Germany’s sixteen federal states 
have passed laws forbidding public school teachers to 
wear religious symbols and clothing in school (Table 1). 
In two states the ban was extended to public servants in 
the field of justice, police and law-enforcement (Berlin 
and Hessen). In Baden-Württemberg and Berlin, legisla-
tion exists also for kindergarten personnel. The other 
eight states have no regulation and continue their case-
by-case approach (Lettinga, 2011). Following Berghahn 
and Rostock (2009) we differentiate between three 
types of policy regimes that now exist in Germany: the 
Christian-Occidental model, the laic model and the case-
by-case model. 
6.1. Christian Occidental Model 
Baden-Württemberg was the first state to enact legis-
lation of the ‘Christian-Occidental’ type on 1 April 
2004. Saarland, Hessen, Bavaria and North Rhine-
Westphalia followed suit. These states’ laws do not ban 
religious symbols for teachers per se, but symbols or 
clothing that endanger the peace at school or the neu-
trality of the state, or else conflict with the basic rights 
of parents and/or pupils, or with the ‘free, democratic 
order’ (or a combination of these).31 All five states have 
formulated exception clauses for symbols of ‘Christian-
Occidental’ values. As the socialist party (SPD) fraction 
leader Peter Wintruff explained: ‘Different from the 
                                                          
30 Urteil BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02. 2003, quoted in Saharso 
(2007). 
31 BW 13/3091, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes, 14 
April 2004. 
headscarf, the crucifix belongs to our Western culture, 
to our tradition and has here a high standing as a reli-
gious evidence of brotherly love, tolerance and human 
dignity […]. We acknowledge the mandate of our federal 
constitution to educate our children according to Chris-
tian and Western cultural values. The state neutrality in 
our public schools may, unlike a Laic state, recognise re-
ligious expression, but only those that don’t contravene 
the embedded human rights’.32 
Attempts to dispute the Christian-Occidental legis-
lation of the five federal states failed (Henkes & Kneip, 
2008). Federal courts have argued that teacher-nuns, 
who are few, should be considered ‘historical excep-
tions’ that do not constitute a systematic discrimina-
tion of Islamic religious communities (Berghahn & Ros-
tock, 2009). 
6.2. Laic Model 
Berlin is a paradigmatic example of the ‘laic’ legislation, 
which has also been passed in Lower Saxony and Bre-
men. Their laws ban all personal expressions of politi-
cal, religious and philosophical beliefs for reasons of 
public neutrality (Bremen and Berlin) or in light of the 
state’s educational mandate (Lower Saxony). 
In Berlin, deputies of the governing parties SPD and 
PDS/Die Linke, as well as the oppositional parties the 
FDP and Greens, all argued that the privatisation of all 
personal religious affiliations by teachers was the best 
guarantee to safeguard religious freedom and religious 
peace. Concerns about Islamic radicalism also shaped 
the debate. 
                                                          
32 BW 13/62, 4 February 2004. 
Table 1. Policy regimes on headscarves in Germany (from: Lettinga, 2011). 
Laic Christian Occidental Case by case Case by case 
Neutrally formulated ban Specific ban: exemption 
for Christian –Occidental 
cultural traditions 
Specific ban rejected: 
context specific approach 
No ban proposed: context 
specific approach 











Berlin 2005 SPD-PDS/Die 
Linke 
Hessen 2004 CDU Hamburg 2004 CDU-FDP-
PRO 
Thuringia 





 Saarland 2004 CDU   
Notes: * Parties denote government; The neutrality law of Hessen concerns both teachers and regular civil servants. The neutrality 
law of Berlin concerns teachers and civil servants, as well as other public functions in the judiciary and the police. In Berlin, Baden-
Württemberg and Hessen teacher-trainees may, ‘in principle’, express personal religious affiliations. The law of Baden-Württemberg 
also forbids the wearing of headscarves for personnel working in kindergartens. The law of Berlin allows this ‘in principle’, unless 
parents complain. 
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The SPD, Greens and FDP agreed that the state had to 
prevent the intrusion of Islamism in public institutions 
by banning politicized signs and symbols.33 Most par-
ties also considered a ban necessary to liberate young 
Muslim girls from patriarchal pressure34, but believed a 
ban on religious signs for teachers only was enough.35 
6.3. Non-Regulation 
Finally, eight states continue a case-by-case approach. In 
Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland Palatinate and Hamburg 
teachers are allowed to express their personal religious 
beliefs unless there is evidence that they disrespect the 
religious views of pupils or parents, or if the school’s 
peace is endangered (e.g. when parents object). Jochen 
Hartloff of the SPD faction argued: ‘We have a separa-
tion between state and church. This is traditionally regu-
lated differently than in France. We too have a separa-
tion, but the boundaries are much more blurred in light 
of our Occidental-Christian background.’36 The CDU pro-
posed to ban headscarves for schoolteachers, but the 
SPD and FDP rejected the CDU’s proposal.37 Five of the 
‘tolerant’ states are former Eastern German states. In 
these states there is no regulation, because there were 
no headscarf conflicts as Muslim migrants form a small 
minority whose presence has not (yet) stirred debates 
about the nation's multicultural outlook. 
In Germany women’s organisations were not invited 
to any policy debate, turning headscarves into a mi-
grant problem. Several women of Turkish origin were 
invited as authorities on Islam. Seyran Ateş (SPD) was 
invited to a public hearing in Baden-Württemberg38 
and (the Kurdish) Necla Kelek and (the Alevi) Serap 
Cileli to a hearing in Rhineland Palatinate.39 These 
women are well-known critics of Islam. In their view 
the headscarf is not a religious duty, but a patriarchal 
tradition used by Islamic fundamentalists. They found 
support from, amongst others, well-known feminist Al-
ice Schwarzer who compared the headscarf to the yel-
low star that Jews were forced to wear during the Nazi 
regime. Women who wore the headscarf were largely 
excluded from the debate. Lacking institutional venues, 
                                                          
33 B .15/36, 25 September 2003; B. 17/58, 28 October 2004; 
B.15/45, 19 February 2004. 
34 B .15/45, 19 February 2004; B. 15/62, 20 January 2005.  
35 Eventually, Berlin established a working group ‘Islam und der 
Schule’ (Islam and the School) to engage with communities, 
families and ‘Islam experts’ (such as outspoken anti-headscarf 
protagonists Necla Kelek and Seyran Ateş) on conflicts related to 
gender and Islam. B. 16/11258, 28 September 2007. 
36 B. 15/53, 17 January 2005. 
37 RP 14/91 17 March 2005: 6094. 
38 Protokoll der 26. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Schule, Jugend 
und Sport vom 12. März 2004. 
39 32. Sitzung des Ausschuss für Bildung und Jugend. 29. Sitzung 
des Rechtsausschusses am 11 Juli 2005 Gemeinsame offentliche 
Sitzung. 
in January 2004 various Muslim women went demon-
strating in Berlin against the ban in civil service.40 New 
Muslim women’s associations emerged, like the Initia-
tive for self-determination (‘Initiative für Selbstbes-
timmung’), which critiqued the stereotypical image of 
veiled women as oppressed victims or fundamental-
ists.41 In 2007, several women created the first national 
Muslim women’s organisation, the Action Alliance (‘Ak-
tionsbündnis’) (Oestreich, 2004). The Green and the 
Social Democrat parties supported the Alliance and or-
ganised a conference on Islam and feminism.42 Women 
wearing headscarves found allies in Commissioners of 
Integration, such as former Berlin Commissioner for 
Foreigners Barbara John (CDU), who argued in a hear-
ing on headscarves for the parliament in Rhineland Pa-
latinate that a ban hampers Muslim women’s’ emanci-
pation because it restricts their access to the labour 
market. She also argued that a ban would pressure 
women to choose the side of their communities and to 
surrender to gender-oppressive community norms ra-
ther than criticize these.43 Together with Berlin Integra-
tion Officer Marieluise Beck (Greens) and the CDU poli-
tician Rita Süssmuth,44 John launched a petition in 2003 
to argue against bans on headscarves and for solidarity 
with all those who fight Islamism, including those with 
headscarves (BPB, 2003). The appeal was signed by 
more than seventy publicly known women. 
Similar to France and the Netherlands, some Ger-
man deputies in the Federal Parliament have started to 
ask for a full ban on the Islamic face cover in public, 
such as Lale Akgün of the SPD fraction did in 2010. Her 
party, however, objected to legislation. SPD expert on 
interior affairs Dieter Wiefelspütz argued that soft 
measures are a better way to develop an ‘Enlighten-
ment Islam’. The Greens also objected, labelling such 
laws as symbolic politics that do not target the heart of 
the problem. The FDP and CDU argued that a ban on 
headscarves offered already sufficient grounds to expel 
pupils with face veils (Deutsche Welle, 2010). So far, no 
legislation has been proposed. 
                                                          
40 The demonstration took place on January 17, 2004. It was or-
ganised by IMbus (Initiative Berliner Muslims). 
41 The Initiative für Selbstbestimmung (‘Initiative for Self-
determination’) wrote various open letters, amongst others to 
Ekin Deligöz, Lale Akgün and Mehmet Daimagüler, who had 
asked Muslim women to remove their headscarves in the weekly 
‘Bild am Sonntag’ (14 October 2006). 
42 The conference ‘Frauen Power im Islam’ took place in Cologne 
in 2008. See Naggar (2008). 
43 32. Sitzung des Ausschuss für Bildung und Jugend/29. Sitzung 
des Rechtssausschusses, Gemeinsame öffentliche Sitzung,11 July 
2005. 
44 Rita Süssmuth was Minister of Family Affairs from 1985 to 
1988. Barbara John was the Commissioner for foreigners 
(‘Ausländerbeauftragte’) to the Berlin Government from 1981 to 
2003. 
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7. Gender and Nation 
Since about the turn of the century, in all three countries 
the headscarf became more often associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism and interpreted as a symbol of gender 
inequality within Islam. How to explain this convergence?  
While several headscarf cases have been brought to 
the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) the con-
vergence is not explained by a growing European influ-
ence. In fact, the ECtHR grants member states a broad 
discretionary scope to interpret the protection of the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the light 
of their national traditions (Berghahn, 2011). Legislators 
in France and Germany explicitly referred to this so-
called ‘margin of appreciation’ to adjust the scope of re-
ligious freedom to these historical traditions (Bowen, 
2007; Lettinga, 2011). The ECtHR thus paradoxically cre-
ates opportunities for politicians to reaffirm and extend 
institutional logics of historical state-church relations (in 
France) or change these in a direction that actually re-
stricts religious freedom (in Germany).  
We considered whether this focus on gender ine-
quality could be attributed to an increasing influence of 
the (institutionalized) women’s movement on the par-
liamentary debates. In France indeed parts of the 
women’s movement organized to demand a ban but 
their statements were in line with the majority of poli-
ticians’ views. It may be that they got a voice because 
of a selective invitation policy on the part of the hear-
ing committees. There were alternative feminist voices, 
but they were not invited and unlike Germany, there 
were no women’s voices within the country’s gender 
machinery or migration departments that opposed a 
ban from a female autonomy frame. In the Nether-
lands the headscarf was so broadly accepted that the 
women’s movement felt no need to mobilize pro or 
contra and thus did not raise its voice. Therefore we 
want to suggest that the change in framing is explained 
by a different development. 
Wearing a headscarf became associated with a rad-
ical political Islam threatening European values at a 
time when Islamic violence manifested itself (inter) na-
tionally. In France and the Netherlands populist anti-
immigrant right wing parties became strong political 
forces. In the Netherlands, the LPF became in 2002, 
hence one year after 9/11, in one blow the second 
largest party in the country. These parties framed the 
headscarf not as an isolated religious issue, but as 
symbolic for Islamic immigrants living in ‘parallel socie-
ties’ unwilling to integrate and respect the basic values 
of the national communities. The headscarf was a vehi-
cle to express concerns about immigration and national 
identity. We interpret the salience that gender equality 
gained as a diagnostic frame in this period as part and 
parcel of this symbolic politics. The gender card was 
drawn to demarcate the boundary between the civi-
lized Westerner and the uncivilized and illiberal Islamic 
outsider. Yet, in 2004, the year that France adopted a 
law to ban ostentatious religious symbols, the Nether-
lands adopted a rule granting women the right to wear 
a headscarf. In Germany several states adopted laws in 
that period, but there is no consistent pattern (see Ta-
ble 1). Despite populist rhetoric shaping the saliency 
and (converging) diagnostic framing of the debate, the 
actual regulation of the headscarf thus appears to be 
more determined by established national citizenship 
and state-religion relations (Hadj-Abdou et al., 2011).  
8. Conclusion 
We expected France and Germany to have more re-
strictive regulation than the Netherlands. France and 
the Netherlands kept to our expectations, but Germany 
only to a certain extent. While France prohibits reli-
gious dress in public schools and public functions, the 
Netherlands and Germany tolerate headscarves for 
pupils. Public school teachers’ headscarves are forbid-
den in eight German states, but (conditionally) allowed 
in eight other states and also allowed in the Nether-
lands. In the latter contry all civil servants have a right 
to wear a headscarf except for court personnel and 
uniformed police officers. In Germany two states have 
passed bans on religious expressions for not only 
teachers but also civil servants. France clearly has the 
most restrictive regulation, then follows Germany, and 
the Netherlands has the most tolerant regulation.  
Our data shows that national histories of nation 
building and old political cleavages are resounding in the 
framing of the headscarf. We do not think therefore that 
citizenship and state-church models are but an invention 
of scholars or politicians. These national traditions are 
however internally more diversified than the idea of na-
tional models might suggest. Against their supposed 
aversion to religion in the public sphere, the French for a 
while allowed headscarves in public schools. This diversi-
fication also offers an explanation for the German case. 
The German state has a tradition of openness to religion, 
but prioritizes Christianity over minority religions, except 
Judaism that is now conceived as part of the Germany's 
Western heritage. The southern German states focused 
on Germany’s exclusionary tradition and defined the 
nation as a Christian-Occidental nation. Other states 
stressed the nation’s traditional openness to religion 
and some other leftwing states reacted against the idea 
of the nation being defined by Christianity and opted for 
a strict separation of state and church. The cases thus il-
lustrate that politicians may select certain aspects of 
their national institutional traditions, thereby affirming 
or combating them, but even if they oppose them they 
do not stand outside of them. Yet national models sug-
gest too much rigidity. It is better perhaps to speak as 
John Bowen suggests in terms of schemas: ‘categories, 
images, propositions, often deeply psychologically em-
bedded in actors’ minds, that may coexist without nec-
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essarily being consistent and that may be weighed dif-
ferently from one moment to another’ (Bowen, 2012, p. 
354). Power constellations and the coalitions’ different 
actors enter into matter for how this discursive battle 
plays out in actual policy formation processes. 
Lastly, what does the framing of the headscarf tell us 
about the social inclusion of Islamic women? In France, Is-
lamic women can be full citizens of the Republic, and in-
creasingly so, only if they take off their headscarf. Other-
wise they are paradoxically perceived as both victims and 
aggressors of a segregationist Islamic community, which is 
unwilling to blend in with the broad French political com-
munity. In the Netherlands the discourse on headscarves 
became more intolerant over the years, but regulation is 
comparatively tolerant and in that sense Islamic women 
can be members of society with inclusion of their head-
scarves. In the southern German states, women wearing 
headscarves are excluded from the nation that is defined 
as a Christian-Occidental nation. In the other German 
states that follow either a laic or a case-by-case approach, 
women wearing a headscarf are seen by politicians as vic-
tims of their communities, but more often as representa-
tives of a political Islam who must constantly prove their 
loyalty to the German nation. In all three countries the 
framing of headscarves as a symbol of gender inequality 
within Islam gained in strength when polarization around 
Islam increased and anti-immigrant populist parties came 
up. Coalition framing emerged between feminist and 
populist politicians, but also frame cooptation by populists 
acting as champions of women’s right. Some feminists 
have started to organize across religious and secular 
boundaries to oppose the instrumentalization of women’s 
rights against Islam. But until these alliances become 
stronger and more influential, headscarf-wearing and par-
ticularly veiled women are still largely excluded from the 
European national imaginary.  
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